Moral Universalism and Pluralism of Values: Revisiting Habermas’s Theory of Discourse Ethics

Abstract

The concept of universalization is one of the most problematic and controversial among those pertaining to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics. As some critics have argued, Habermas’s requirement that moral disagreements be resolved through the identification or institution of a commonly shared interest on the basis of which to establish a universal agreement on the validity of the normative claims aimed at its satisfaction is unrealistic given the inherently pluralistic conditions in which these disagreements tend to manifest themselves. Some have pointed out that the fulfillment of such a requirement could be highly pernicious due to the homogenizing, paternalistic, and even totalitarian attitudes and practices to which this could potentially give rise. Contrary to these criticisms, this article argues that moral universalism—in the particular way in which Habermas conceives of it—and the existence of a pluralism of values are not only compatible but also, in fact, interdependent achievements.