Religion, Meaning, and the Limits of Explanation: Wittgenstein on Frazer

Abstract

Summary: This paper explores Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, advancing the working hypothesis that these reflections emerge at the intersection of three key ideas that Wittgenstein decisively resists. First, Wittgenstein challenges the assumption that language games can be analyzed independently of the “vital” or “cultural” practices in which they are embedded. Second, he rejects the positivist notion that the progress of natural science will eventually render religion obsolete. Third, and most pointedly, he disputes the idea of a “universal grammar” underlying religious practices — a supposed structure hidden beneath the surface diversity of religious expressions. Through his remarks, Wittgenstein not only offers a powerful critique of the search for hidden essences — emphasizing the irreducibly plural and context-dependent nature of religious language — but also lays the groundwork for the methodological orientation that will characterize his later philosophical investigations.