Beter leren leven met verwijten

Abstract

The article takes as its starting point a recent book by the Flemish philosopher Farah Focquaert, in which she questions the idea that agents can be blamed for their unlawful actions. In line with other free will skeptics, Focquaert argues that a scientific (deterministic) worldview implies that individuals lack the kind of control over their actions required to be genuinely ‘guilty’ or ‘blameworthy’. She seeks to draw out the far-reaching implications of this view for the organization of criminal justice systems, and maintains that her position is compatible with, and even supportive of, restorative justice. This article challenges that claim. It argues that free will–skeptical attempts to eliminate blame from public responses to crime risk undermining the moral dimension of wrongdoing – and of our responses to it – which restorative justice seeks to rehabilitate. First, the article shows that, although there is some convergence between free will skeptics and the restorative justice movement in their critique of the destructive aspects of current criminal justice systems, the one-sided emphasis of free will skeptics on abandoning retribution may erode important safeguards against excessive state control. Second, it argues that free will skeptics fail to articulate a meaningful concept of human responsibility that aligns with the central concerns of restorative justice. Third, it contends that the anti-retributive rhetoric of free will skepticism is at odds with the participatory nature of restorative justice and the cultural diversity it aims to respect.