Sep 2026· Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi· Vol 10, pp. 316-336· 0 citations· 11 references
Abstract
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the canonical model in microeconomics for the tension between individual rationality and collective welfare. Standard game-theoretic analysis predicts that mutual defection is the unique Nash equilibrium, despite being Pareto-dominated by mutual cooperation. This study revisits the Prisoner’s Dilemma through the lens of evolutionary game theory, in which strategy frequencies in a population evolve according to differential payoffs. We derive the replicator equation for the one-shot game and show analytically that the all-defectors state is the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium and the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. We then extend the analysis to the infinitely repeated game with continuation probability , contrasting the reactive strategy Tit-for-Tat (TFT) with Always Defect (ALLD). We derive the critical continuation probability above which TFT becomes an ESS within the restricted two-strategy space (that is, resists invasion by ALLD), the bistable replicator dynamics that emerge in that regime, and a closed-form expression for the unstable interior equilibrium that separates the two basins of attraction. The bifurcation structure is interpreted economically as a precise formalisation of Axelrod’s “shadow of the future.” All results are derived from first principles and illustrated with numerical examples.
Replicator dynamics, the central model of evolutionary game theory, describe populations evolving under selection and agents learning by trial and error. They also admit a third use: continuous-time Bayesian inference, in which an agent planning against an opponent accumulates evidence for each candidate strategy. Here...
Jaime Ruiz-Serra, Nihat Ay, Michael S. Harré· 0 citations
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is often studied in terms of strategy performance and long-run cooperation. This paper offers an alternative perspective: given a finite set of strategies, the long-run interaction between strategies is interpreted as an induced symmetric 2 × 2 game, and the distribution of such induced...
Aspiration dynamics can favor cooperation on finite graphs through a purely local satisfaction mechanism. In the model studied here, individuals compare their payoffs with adaptive aspiration levels and revise their strategies through a self-switching Fermi rule. Although the aspirations are continuous and endogenous,...
K. Dhaker· Journal of Theoretical Biolo...· 0 citations
In evolutionary game dynamics, strategies undergo mutation and natural selection. Owing to practical limitations, many studies simulate evolution in a restricted strategy space. This is especially true for repeated games, where long-run strategies can be arbitrarily complex. It can be challenging to find a suitable s...
Philip LaPorte, Pranav Velavan· Proceedings of the Royal Soc...· 0 citations
In social dilemma games, additional rewards or punishments have been studied as means of promoting cooperation. Therefore, it is important to investigate the ideal situation, in which such an additional payoff would change the game. In this study, we investigated the symmetric solution of the Bellman optimality equatio...
Against fierce stock competition, domestic sectors including express logistics, new energy photovoltaic and new energy vehicles suffer from price wars, homogeneous competition, overcapacity and shrinking profits. Most market participants fall into the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where individual rational acts hurt collective i...
Ling-Ya Jiang· SHS Web of Conferences· 0 citations
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