Civil-military relations in Pakistan: Institutional contests, democratic erosion, and the consolidation of military supremacy (2020-2026)

Abstract

Pakistan’s civil-military relations remain central to understanding its democratic development and institutional stability. This study examines civil-military relations from 2020 to 2026, focusing on institutional conflict, civilian authority, and military influence over governance. It addresses the problem of persistent power imbalances between elected governments and the military, particularly during political transitions and constitutional change. Using a qualitative case-study approach, the research analyses constitutional documents, official records, scholarly literature, and credible media reports. Its theoretical framework combines Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control, Morris Janowitz’s constabulary model, and Samuel Finer’s theory of military intervention. The findings examine the breakdown of the Imran Khan-military alignment, political developments following April 2022, the February 2024 elections, and the 27th Constitutional Amendment of 2025. The study argues that these developments raise important questions about democratic accountability, institutional autonomy, and prospects for civilian supremacy in Pakistan.