DETERRENCE BY ASSETS: HOW UAV LOCALIZATION UNDER SAUDI VISION 2030 RESHAPES GULF SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Abstract

This paper argues that Saudi UAV localization under Vision 2030 is likely to alter Gulf security architecture by shifting deterrence from alliance dependence toward asset-based resilience, industrial autonomy, and procurement adaptability. The study addresses a research gap in strategic studies and defense industrial policy: existing scholarship has examined Gulf alliance politics, UAV proliferation, and military innovation separately,but has less often connected them to localized production, reverse-engineering, and the economics of interception depletion. Using qualitative policy analysis, conceptual synthesis, and comparative strategic studies, the paper traces how the localization agenda may strengthen Saudi strategic control over supply chains, training, maintenance, and doctrinal adaptation. The analysis develops a detailed case study of the U.S. military's reported reverse-engineering of Iranian-derived UAVs, including Task Force Scorpion and the LUKAS system, to illustrate how battlefield learning can accelerate counter-UAV innovation and reshape procurement incentives. The principal finding is that deterrence by assets is not a substitute for alliances, but it can reduce vulnerability to coercion and increase bargaining leverage within a more multipolar Gulf order. Policy implications include deeper local industrial capability, stronger test- and- evaluation institutions, and calibrated cooperation with Western and Asian partners.