RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF TRUST, OPPORTUNISM, AND SOLIDARITY IN ECUADORIAN SMES

Abstract

This study analyzes relational governance in micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ecuador, focusing on the paradox of coexistence between trust and opportunism. The objective is to quantify structural dependence and evaluate how institutional voids affect social capital under the lenses of Transaction Cost Economics and Social Exchange Theory. Using a sample of 107 companies, this quantitative correlational research measures trust, opportunism, and solidarity levels toward suppliers, clients, and competitors. Findings reveal extreme structural dependence: 89% of micro-enterprises rely on a remarkably small client group for 80% of their revenue. Furthermore, the coexistence paradox is empirically confirmed, where high levels of opportunism from clients (43.3%) are tolerated through unconditional hyper-solidarity (98.1%) and "calculative trust" acting as safeguard mechanisms against institutional weakness. In horizontal governance, low intra-industry trust (37.3%) hinders coopetition strategies. The article proposes a hybrid relational governance framework integrating digital technologies.