This paper presents a proactive defense framework for securing LLMs against evolving multi-turn adversarial attacks that combines disruption, misdirection, and adaptation across successive interaction turns and employs a cooperative multi-agent architecture.
Abstract
As LLMs become increasingly integrated into complex applications, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks has raised significant concerns. However, existing defenses remain reactive in nature. This limitation makes it difficult for them to counter sophisticated threats, as adversaries continuously adjust their strategies across multi-turn interactions. In this paper, we present a proactive defense framework for securing LLMs against evolving multi-turn adversarial attacks that combines disruption, misdirection, and adaptation across successive interaction turns. In particular, it employs a cooperative multi-agent architecture in which specialized agents execute complementary defense strategies. These strategies include controlled response pacing to increase attack costs, strategically ambiguous outputs to mislead adversaries into ineffective strategies, and forensic analysis of interaction logs to identify attack patterns and refine defenses. These agents are coordinated by an adaptive mechanism that dynamically adjusts the defense strategy in response to escalating threats. To facilitate comprehensive evaluation, we present the EMRA dataset designed to simulate evolving strategies across multi-turn attacks, including 5,200 adversarial samples across eight attack types. Experimental results on EMRA across multiple LLM backbones show that the proposed framework reduces ASR by 69% on average relative to evaluated state-of-the-art baselines. Beyond suppressing harmful outputs, it sustains deceptive engagement, achieving an average DR more than six times that of the strongest baselines and increasing attacker-token consumption by 198.83% on average relative to evaluated baselines. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/SiyuanLi00/CoopGuard.
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