The rise and fall of anti-corruption agencies in Indonesia’s emerging democracy

Abstract

The article critically discusses the tensions between political power, institutional independence and the persistence of corruption by examining the historic development of several anti-corruption initiatives in Indonesia and the problems faced by Indonesia’s anti-corruption agencies in fighting corruption. Using qualitative research methods, it contends that anti-corruption agencies initially thrive in reform-oriented political coalitions but are institutionally vulnerable when their enforcement activities threaten entrenched political-economic interests. Instead of viewing institutional decline as a consequence of organisational design, this article demonstrates a more comprehensive governance perspective where effectiveness of anti-graft measures is conditioned by changing elite coalitions, political incentives and resilience of democratic accountability mechanism. Drawing on Indonesia’s experience, especially the rise and fall of the contemporary KPK, Indonesia’s central corruption control agency, the article demonstrates the fragility of institutional reforms under entrenched power and elite opposition. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures depends not only on the formal design of institutions, but also on the broader political configuration in which agencies operate, in particular elite alignments, sustained political commitment, the capacity of civil society and the role the media can play in mobilising public support in building accountability. This article contributes to the comparative governance literature by conceptualising anti-corruption agencies as politically embedded institutions, whose developmental trajectories are shaped by the relationship between institutional autonomy and elite power. It offers a generic analytical framework to account for the cyclical rise, consolidation, and decline of anti-corruption agencies in the Global South, where democratic institutions coexist with resilient networks of elite capture. The article ends with the conclusion that effective and durable anti-corruption control depends on operational autonomy and transparent public administration, but also on the presence of sustained reform coalitions that are able to withstand elite backlash and maintain democratic accountability.