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Forensic Cryptanalysis of the Backdoored UA-8295 Message Terminal

2026 · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Vol 2026, pp. 1309 · 0 citations · 52 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This paper presents the first detailed forensic cryptanalysis of the backdoored UA-8295 message terminal and proposes a methodology based on the Backdoor Conjecture that provides handles to reason about the design of backdoors and the attacks they are designed for.

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