Cooperation or AI-driven self-reliance? Supplier channel exit decisions in live-streaming supply chain
TL;DR
A two-stage Stackelberg game model between the supplier and the MCN reveals that channel exit disrupts the inherent zero-sum competitive relationship within the supply chain, and that different combinations of spillover intensity and consumer AI preference yield differentiated equilibrium outcomes.
Abstract
As AI technology rapidly matures, suppliers are actively establishing self-operated AI-hosted channels while continuing to rely on MCN resale channels. The cross-channel traffic spillover effect and consumers' AI preference have intensified channel conflicts, prompting some suppliers to consider exiting MCN partnerships. To examine the feasibility of such supplier exit behavior, this paper develops a two-stage Stackelberg game model between the supplier and the MCN. The analysis reveals that channel exit disrupts the inherent zero-sum competitive relationship within the supply chain, and that different combinations of spillover intensity and consumer AI preference yield differentiated equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, when consumers exhibit strong preference for AI streamers, the MCN instead benefits from enhanced sales profits. Moreover, consumer channel preference tends to compress consumer surplus; however, a multi-party win can be achieved when a strong spillover effect coincides with low-to-moderate consumer AI preference. This study provides theoretical guidance for suppliers' channel-exit decisions and MCNs' response strategies, and offers practical references for livestream market regulation.