ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN BIOSECURITY

Abstract

The article examines artificial intelligence as a dual-use technology in the field of biological security and substantiates directions for the adaptive regulation of public administration in this sphere. Its relevance stems from the fact that the integration of AI into biological research is expanding the possibilities of epidemiological monitoring and crisis management while simultaneously generating new categories of risk associated with a lowered threshold of entry for dangerous manipulations of biological agents. For Ukraine, the problem is particularly acute under conditions of war and the course towards European integration, while the current regulatory framework, as of 2026, does not take AI-related risks into account. It is established that the governance gap is a multi-level phenomenon that manifests differently at the operational, scientific-technological, and institutional levels, requiring a differentiated rather than a uniform response – from procedural adaptation to the formation of accountability mechanisms. An original functional classification of the manifestations of AI’s dual nature is proposed, together with a system of criteria for assessing the readiness of international (EU, USA) and national governance systems, which reveals a gap configuration specific to Ukraine – technological readiness outpacing managerial capacity. The scientific novelty lies in substantiating an original conceptual model of the adaptive governance of AI in biosecurity that integrates the source of risk, the institutional challenge, the adaptation mechanism, and the managerial outcome into a coherent construct. The practical significance lies in identifying directions for integrating AI governance instruments already available in Ukraine into the biosecurity system.