The Principle of Separation of Powers in the UAE Constitutional System: Legislative Oversight of the Executive and the Limits of Legislative Authority in Relation to the Judiciary

Abstract

This research examines the principle of separation of powers in the constitutional system of the United Arab Emirates, with particular emphasis on the nature and effectiveness of legislative oversight of the executive and the constitutional limits governing legislative involvement in judicial affairs. The study adopts descriptive-analytical, historical, comparative, and critical approaches. It analyzes the constitutional distribution of federal authority, the legislative participation of the UAE Council of Ministers and the Federal National Council (FNC), the FNC’s oversight mechanisms, and the constitutional and legislative guarantees of judicial independence. Limited comparative references are used to clarify the distinctive features of the UAE model rather than to treat a foreign parliamentary system as a normative benchmark. The research finds that the UAE constitutional order reflects a flexible and functionally differentiated separation of powers. Institutional interaction is particularly visible in the legislative process and in the FNC’s oversight of the executive through questions, discussion of general issues, and recommendations. However, the legal effect of several oversight outputs remains limited, giving the model a predominantly cooperative and consultative character. In relation to the judiciary, legislative authority extends to the regulation of courts, jurisdiction, and procedures but is constitutionally constrained by judicial independence. The study concludes that the effectiveness of the UAE model lies in balancing institutional cooperation with functional autonomy, while recommending stronger follow-up mechanisms for parliamentary oversight and continued protection of the core of judicial independence.