A efetividade anticorrupção dos programas de compliance: teoria, evidências e estudos de caso

Abstract

This article analyzes the effectiveness of compliance programs as a preventive mechanism against corruption and corporate fraud in Brazil, comparing the formal adoption of these programs with their practical impact on corporate integrity. It is based on the premise that this effectiveness depends on the genuine commitment of top management, the integration of compliance into the company’s corporate culture, and ongoing monitoring mechanisms. The methodology combines a literature review on the fundamentals of compliance with an analysis of empirical research involving companies listed on B3 and a documentary examination of the Petrobras and Odebrecht cases. The results demonstrate that, despite formal adherence exceeding 86% among large Ibovespa-listed companies, weaknesses persist in risk assessment, continuous monitoring, and the corporate culture; the scandals analyzed reveal that the involvement of senior management undermines formally established controls. The critical analysis points to the inadequacy of the economic incentives under Law No. 12,846/2013, organized hypocrisy, and the limitations of the organizational accountability model in concentrated ownership structures as obstacles to effective compliance in the country. It is concluded that the initial hypothesis is only partially confirmed, since leadership engagement and corporate culture, while necessary, are not sufficient when the controlling shareholders themselves act as agents of corruption, a scenario in which the effectiveness of compliance comes to depend on reforms in external enforcement and the direct accountability of controlling shareholders, ultimately proposing a research agenda on the governance mechanisms applicable to this scenario.