Judicial precedent in Ukraine and the U.S. doctrine of stare decisis: a functional comparison

Abstract

The article offers a functional comparison between the legal conclusions of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the United States doctrine of stare decisis. The study rejects the conventional binary claim that precedent either exists or does not exist in a civil-law system. Instead, it asks which institutional functions earlier judgments perform, who must follow them, which part of a judgment carries authority, and through what procedure an established position may be changed. The methodology combines comparative, doctrinal, structural-functional, and case-law analysis. The Ukrainian model is examined through the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine «On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges», procedural codes, the exemplary-case mechanism in administrative justice, and the Supreme Court’s practice on departure from earlier legal conclusions. The United States part is limited principally to federal stare decisis and distinguishes its vertical and horizontal dimensions, as well as statutory and constitutional precedent. The study finds that Ukraine has developed a statutory, court-centered system of precedent-like authority. A Supreme Court conclusion is binding on public authorities and must be taken into account by other courts, while procedural law channels departure through chambers, joint chambers, and the Grand Chamber. This architecture approximates vertical stare decisis but does not reproduce the American doctrine. In the United States, the binding force of a holding follows from judicial hierarchy and an established doctrine rather than from a legislative direction to “take into account” legal conclusions. American courts also distinguish holdings from dicta and apply differentiated standards for overruling constitutional and statutory precedents. Recent decisions, including Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, demonstrate both the constraining force and the contested flexibility of horizontal stare decisis. The article proposes a five-stage precedent protocol for Ukraine: identification of material facts, formulation of the legal issue, extraction of the rule necessary to the judgment, assessment of similarity, and verification of the conclusion’s current status. It further recommends an official status-marked database of Supreme Court conclusions, express standards for distinguishing and overruling, enhanced-reasoning requirements, and consideration of prospective effect where abrupt doctrinal change would seriously impair reliance interests. These reforms would strengthen consistency without converting judicial conclusions into legislation or compromising judicial independence.