Reconstructing The Industrial Economy Based On Anti-Corruption Values: Preventing Rent-Seeking

Abstract

The framework of industrial economic theory so far tends to put market efficiency as a sole benchmark, without taking into account the social cost of corruption. The study aimed to reorganize the framework by positioning a series of hunting practice (torrent-seeking) as a factor directly distorting resource allocation, market structure, and a healthy business competition. The originality of the study lies in the integration of the anti-corruption indicators into the conceptual building of industry economy, which has been separately discussed in the political and governance literature, so the no conceptual formula that has brought together. Its contribution is to fill the theoretical gap while offering a framework that can be applied to the formulation of market regulation, licensing systems, and the analysis of competition structures. The research used a qualitative-dative approach through a systematic literature review of industrial economy, institutional economics, and anti-corruption studies, which followed by konsepual studies of reconstruction to develop a new proposition. The results show that the hunt for a series of working through the administrative barriers and produces a lost efficiency gap and is not read by the indicators of conventional structures. This finding confirms that industrial performance assessments that only rely on market concentrations have the potential to be mistaken for reading inefficiency sources. The basic economic concept update by including the anti-corruption dimensions and transparency strengthened the national industry's competitiveness and suppressing losses due to a barrage of hunting, with practical implications for building industrial policy and the supervision of business competition. Keywords: Industrial Economy; Anti-Corruption; Rent-Seeking; Conceptual        Reconstruction; Governance.