Epistemology and Ethics in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism: ἐποχή and ἀταραξία

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between epistemology and ethics in Sextus Empiricus’ conception of Pyrrhonian Scepticism as presented in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις). It investigates whether Sextus’ work should be understood primarily as a practical, ethical guide aimed at tranquillity (ἀταραξία), or as an epistemological strategy oriented toward suspension of judgement (ἐποχή) with respect to the scientific and philosophical beliefs of the dogmatists. Assessment (ἐπίκρισις), understood as a specific stage of dialectical assessment within the broader process of inquiry (ζήτησις), occupies a significant place in this account and is carried out through Pyrrhonian argumentative strategies, especially the Agrippan modes. The study suggests that, in Sextus’ conception, epistemology and ethics are inseparable, and that the question whether Pyrrhonism should be understood primarily as an ethical or as an epistemological enterprise remains undecided.