The Future of Naval Power Projection: Carrier Strike Groups, Domain Continuity, and Strategic Corridors in the Age of Hypersonics and Quantum AI

Abstract

The carrier strike group (CSG) has been the emblem of maritime power projection for eight decades. This paper asks whether, and in what form, it can remain so as hypersonic missiles, proliferated space-based sensing, quantum and non-acoustic detection and agentic artificial intelligence (AI) compress the time and space in which naval forces operate. Working at the level of strategy and doctrine, it first corrects several widely repeated technical claims: hypersonic weapons are manoeuvrable but kinematically constrained, with turn radii of tens to hundreds of kilometres; a carrier cannot out-run them but is not a stationary target, because its kilometre-scale displacement over a missile's time of flight compounds the adversary's targeting problem; and quantum magnetometry erodes, but does not abolish, the opacity of the ocean. The paper then develops five arguments. First, survival has moved from the platform to the architecture: space, sea, land and subsea sensors must hand over track custody without seams. Second, command and control (C2) faces a Weberian paradox that AI-enabled "fluid institutions" can ease only if human authority, auditability and legal review are preserved. Third, the cost-exchange between cheap offence and expensive defence is now a first-order strategic variable. Fourth, the carrier's enduring value lies increasingly in strategic corridors (the Strait of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal and the sea lines of communication that feed them) and in the governance of the deep seabed, where the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) frames what navies may lawfully do. Fifth, four doctrine models (the Standoff Fortress, the Distributed Nodal Network, Chokepoint Denial and the Floating Liability) span the possibility set for the coming two decades. A section on the Bay of Bengal draws out implications for littoral and smaller states, including Bangladesh. Nine conceptual and computed figures and eight tables support the analysis, which contains no operational, targeting or engagement guidance.