Differential Game Analysis of Green Financing Mode in Dual Capital‐Constrained Supply Chains: The Impact of Integrating Blockchain Technology

Abstract

Capital‐constrained low‐carbon manufacturers can choose between guarantee credit financing (GCF) and mixed financing (MF). The lack of transparency in financing information makes blockchain technology (BT) a promising solution to traditional financing challenges. How to introduce BT and make financing decisions has become a pressing challenge. This paper comprehensively considers the two financing modes of GCF and MF, and the introduction of BT or not, and constructs differential game models under four scenarios. The feedback dynamic equilibrium strategies of all members in each scenario are obtained, and BT introduction strategy and the financing mode selection in the capital‐constrained low‐carbon supply chain (CC‐LCSC) are explored. The results show that not only higher initial emissions and carbon prices but also baseline bankruptcy risk assessment coefficient and usage cost of BT suppress the CER efforts, total carbon emissions, and profits. In the same financing mode, whether introducing BT can bring better economic and environmental performance depends on the consumer green trust and usage cost of BT. In different financing modes, the MF mode can achieve “reducing emissions through loans,” and the higher the bankruptcy risk assessment correction coefficient, the more significant the advantage of introducing BT in this mode. Under conditions of moderate bankruptcy risk assessment correction coefficient and usage cost of BT, elevated consumer green trust enhances the superiority of the MF mode under the scenario with BT in achieving optimal profits and CER efforts, though it does not yield the lowest total carbon emissions.