Oligopolistic control elite in local corruption networks of Malang regency, Indonesia

Abstract

This study aims to describe how political clientelism networks function in the practice of corruption at the local level, with a focus on Malang Regency. By applying a qualitative approach through content analysis of the Supreme Court's decision on corruption cases involving RK and data analysis using NVivo 12 Plus software, this study highlights five main forms of political clientelism practices, namely fundraising politics, political bartering, transactional politics, collusive relationships, and intermediary politics. The findings indicate that political fundraising acts as a gateway to the creation of political contracts between patrons and clients, while political bartering and transactional politics mark the institutionalization of calculative and transaction-based reciprocal relationships. Collusive relationships and intermediary politics function as channels of communication and interaction between actors that maintain the stability of corruption networks through vertical integration between political elites, bureaucratic apparatus, and business actors. Social network analysis shows a hierarchical structure dominated by a handful of dominant actors as super-intermediaries with oligopolistic control over public resources.The results of the study contribute to the need for anti-corruption policies that focus on severing social networks of power, rather than merely imposing individual sanctions. The limitations of this study lie in its dependence on Supreme Court decision documents, so the recommendation for further research is to expand comparative studies between regions by utilizing field data in the form of interviews, observations, and relevant secondary data.