Nov 2026· Proceedings of the 2026 ACM Conference on Post-Quantum and Quantum-based Security· 0 citations· 7 references
TL;DR
MuckleTEE is proposed, a hardware-software co-design that hardens hybrid key exchange against a fully compromised host by confining only its security-critical state to a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), while delegating heavy cryptographic operations and networking to the untrusted domain.
Abstract
The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is often reduced to a primitive-replacement problem, yet the security of PQC schemes remains dependent on the integrity of the underlying host. Quantum-secure protocol frameworks like Muckle offer robust hybrid security by combining classical, post-quantum and quantum key exchanges with guarantees for Post-Compromise Security (PCS) and Forward Secrecy (FS); these guarantees collapse, however, in the face of a compromised operating system capable of exfiltrating keys, manipulating nonces, or rolling back the protocol state. We propose MuckleTEE, a hardware-software co-design that hardens hybrid key exchange against a fully compromised host by confining only its security-critical state to a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), while delegating heavy cryptographic operations and networking to the untrusted domain. The construction is generic over KEM-based hybrid key exchange; we instantiate it on a signature-free variant, which lets the enclave authenticate without generating post-quantum signatures, leaving only passive certificate verification inside the trusted boundary. Benchmarks on hardware Intel SGX show the TEE boundary adds 7.6% CPU-time overhead, and a formal analysis in the extended HAKE framework shows that MuckleTEE preserves session-key confidentiality, long-term identity-key secrecy, and post-compromise security against host compromise; recovery after enclave compromise requires a subsequent enclave-only fresh secret.
This paper presents concrete implementations of Zero-Knowledge Arguments (ZKAs), analogous to but distinct from traditional Σ-protocols, and describes two variants: one with dynamic public key encapsulation (CPA-DE) and another that is non-interactive (CPA-NI).
Randy Kuang, Daniel Johnson, D. Panario· Quantum Inf. Technol. J.· 0 citations
A game-based definition at the combiner layer is given at the combiner layer and a two-sided separation is proved: a combiner that ignores the transcript is downgraded with certainty, whereas one that binds the session key and the confirmation tag to a hash of the transcript blocks every such attempt.
This work proposes a QKD-PQC hybrid for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE), establishes AKE security in the CK01 model and yields a conditional information-theoretic security guarantee when the QKD component is uncompromised; a property not achieved by prior hybrid protocols.
The advent of quantum computing poses a critical threat to conventional cryptographic systems, potentially rendering many widely used algorithms obsolete. To address this challenge, this study proposes the quantum adaptive security algorithm for key management systems (QASA-KMS), a hybrid security framework that integr...
Neethi Narayanan, S. M. C. Vigila· International Journal of Adv...· 0 citations