This work proposes the first semantics-aware data purification framework for black-box backdoor defense, SemPurify, which explicitly incorporates multi-level semantics within a text-to-image (T2I) framework to guide image restoration during purification.
Abstract
Backdoor attacks have emerged as a critical security threat in machine learning, where adversaries embed triggers within poisoned training samples to manipulate a model's predictions on targeted inputs while leaving its general behavior unaffected. This stealthy nature makes backdoor attacks difficult to detect, as the model functions normally until activated by a specific malicious trigger. Current purification-based defenses use image transformations (e.g., blurring) to disrupt trigger patterns but often degrade image quality. Even with advanced restoration techniques like diffusion models, these approaches can still alter visual or semantic information, reducing utility for downstream tasks. To address this, we propose the first semantics-aware data purification framework for black-box backdoor defense, SemPurify, which explicitly incorporates multi-level semantics (i.e., low-level semantic embeddings and high-level image tags) within a text-to-image (T2I) framework to guide image restoration during purification. Using this semantic information, the T2I model subsequently refines the transformed samples, helping preserve visual details and semantic information during restoration. Extensive experiments spanning multiple backdoor scenarios, i.e., classification models, CLIP-style encoders, and generative models, demonstrate that SemPurify reliably removes backdoors while effectively preserving semantic information for downstream tasks.
Traditional backdoor attacks inject artificial trigger patterns into training data, causing models to misclassify triggered inputs while maintaining normal behavior on clean samples. Since these artificial triggers are absent in clean datasets, standard knowledge distillation (KD) typically eliminates them, leading to...
Junhoo Lee, Baekseung Kim, Seungyeon Kim et al.· 0 citations
Backdoored large language models (LLMs) can behave normally on benign inputs while producing attacker-specified outputs under hidden triggers. Existing defenses span four stages---prior-training, in-training, post-training, and inference-time---and share one of two underlying strategies: either suppress backdoor learni...
Jian-Wei Li, Min-Seon Kim, Jung-Eun Kim· 1 citation
A residual-stream covert-channel attack is introduced that maps messages to codewords and injects them into an intermediate residual stream through a compromised runtime hook and is scaled with the local residual norm using the signal-to-residual-norm ratio.
Large vision-language models (LVLMs) routinely use inference-time visual-token compression to prune hundreds of patch tokens down to a compact budget. Existing LVLM backdoors fire whenever a triggered image appears, whereas prior deployment-triggered attacks activate only when model weights are quantized or pruned. How...
Zhi-Fang Zhang, Qi-Rui Huang, Chen-Peng Wang et al.· 0 citations
With the widespread adoption of Text-to-Image (T2I) Diffusion Models (DMs) across various applications, their security has attracted increasing attention. In particular, these models are highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries implant hidden triggers during training to manipulate model outputs at infer...
Xian-Fei Cai, Yan-Xin Yang, Ming Hu et al.· Proceedings of the 34th ACM...· 0 citations
Agents are increasingly susceptible to hijack attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in cross-modal inputs (e.g., adversarial images or retrieved web content) are used to deceive the agent's execution. Existing defenses typically rely on strict filtering or refusal mechanisms, which suffer from a critical limit...
Che Wang, Fu-Yao Zhang, Jiaming Zhang et al.· Proceedings of the 34th ACM...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.