AI Machines vs the Non-Processing Minds of Classical Theism

Abstract

In the paper I contrast what I take to be a universal feature of all the AI research – namely focusing on processing information or transitions from one state of a machine to another – with the role assigned to non-processing minds in the classical theism framework. I briefly discuss the latter in epistemological context – the issue of inferential internalism and some problems of transparency, opacity, and trust. In this I show that the contrast between AI and the classical theism outlook is highly relevant for the cluster of issues relating to transparency or opacity, reliabilism, and trust, which is discussed today as the black-box problem. In particular, I identify in this context what I take to be the most serious aspect of the black-box problem; I reject the idea that the problem is a superficial one; and I claim that it poses basic limits on the AI research and cannot be solved along the lines of Explainable Artificial Intelligence.