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Protocol Constraints on Post-Quantum Migration of Offline Authentication in Android HCE Payment System

2026 · International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications · 0 citations · 48 references

Abstract

Mobile payment systems built on Host Card Emulation (HCE) inherit cryptographic foundations, such as RSA-based offline data authentication, that were designed long before quantum attacks were a concern. NIST has now finalized its first post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards, and payment operators are starting to plan migrations, yet little work has looked at how PQC signatures fit into the protocol messages of wallet-based offline authentication. This study examines whether standardized post-quantum signatures can replace RSA in EMV offline data authentication without changing the data-object encoding, the short-form APDU exchange, or the terminal kernel. We evaluate a non-tokenized Android HCE card profile that supports Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation (CDA), the offline authentication method required by the current Kernel 4 specification. A protocol state-machine model is reconstructed from public specifications, and the full set of offline-authentication objects, including the certificate chain, is budgeted against the protocol limits. The smallest standardized PQC signature, ML-DSA-44, produces a GENERATE AC response of at least 2438 bytes where the short-form limit is 256 bytes, and each ML-DSA-44 certificate needs at least 3732 bytes against a 254-byte record limit, since ML-DSA offers no message recovery. At the only bit rate EMV allows, sending this response alone takes about 184 ms of the 400 ms that EMV allocates to the card. Protocol framing, rather than computation, is therefore the main obstacle.

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