This paper presents MetaPI, an extensible toolkit that automatically identifies plausible injection points, generates realistic attack objectives, optimizes adaptive payloads, and validates attacks in the real environment, and enables scalable and consistent security evaluation across diverse and evolving agent ecosystems.
Abstract
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly perform complex tasks using high-privilege tools, making indirect prompt injection (IPI) a critical security risk. However, IPI benchmarks lag behind their rapidly evolving utility counterparts, only offering limited task and environment coverage and relying on narrow, static attack scenarios. In this paper, we propose meta-benchmarking for IPI: transforming existing utility benchmarks into end-to-end IPI evaluation suites that reuse their realistic tasks, environments, and infrastructure. We present MetaPI, an extensible toolkit that automatically identifies plausible injection points, generates realistic attack objectives, optimizes adaptive payloads, and validates attacks in the real environment. Its modular interfaces support heterogeneous environments, agents, defenses, and attack algorithms, allowing new components to be integrated without redesigning the evaluation pipeline. We apply MetaPI to AppWorld, VitaBench, and Terminal-Bench and evaluate representative agents and defenses across multiple backbone LLMs. Our results show that no evaluated defense simultaneously achieves strong utility and strong security in realistic, adaptive agentic IPI settings. MetaPI thus enables scalable and consistent security evaluation across diverse and evolving agent ecosystems
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Agentic systems are now being widely used to orchestrate tools and reason over long contexts. However, the improving capabilities of the large language models powering these agents also create new attack surfaces for indirect prompt injection. In particular, an attacker may not need to place a complete malicious instru...
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