Nov 2026· PLoS ONE· Vol 21, pp. e0358974· 0 citations· 41 references
Medicine
TL;DR
This study evaluates ML-KEM on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller under deep learning(DL)-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCA), revealing that a single power trace enables 32-byte message recovery with 99.98% accuracy, while cross-device testing across three chips achieves over 99% accuracy, highlighting critical DL-driven threats.
Abstract
Quantum computing undermines traditional public-key cryptosystems like RSA and ECC, prompting NIST to standardize Module Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) as a core Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) scheme in August 2024. Despite its theoretical security, ML-KEM’s practical vulnerability in embedded systems remains underexplored. This study evaluates ML-KEM on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller under deep learning(DL)-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCA), revealing that a single power trace enables 32-byte message recovery with 99.98% accuracy, while cross-device testing across three chips achieves over 99% accuracy, highlighting critical DL-driven threats. To better understand the spectral characteristics exploited by deep-learning-based side-channel attacks, we conduct a controlled frequency-band sensitivity study using Butterworth and Chebyshev low-pass filters applied to recorded traces. Across different cutoff frequencies and filter orders, the validation accuracy decreases substantially under aggressive attenuation, indicating that a significant fraction of exploitable leakage resides in higher-frequency components. Rather than claiming that offline digital filtering constrains a realistic adversary, we interpret these results as evidence for where leakage-sensitive information is concentrated, thereby providing guidance for implementable countermeasures such as masking, shuffling, desynchronization, and acquisition-path power/EM conditioning in embedded PQC systems. This cost-efficient solution requires no algorithm/hardware modifications, emphasizing the urgency of implementation-level protections for secure PQC deployment in resource-constrained systems.
Quantum computers threaten traditional cryptography, making the development of quantum-secure cryptographic schemes essential. Module-Lattice–based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), recently standardized by NIST for post-quantum public-key encryption, plays a critical role in enabling quantum-resistant key establis...
NIST standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber as an ML-KEM, a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism to resist attacks using quantum computers. However, side-channel analysis, which exploits analog leakage from electronic devices, has already broken several implementations. In particular, the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform requires d...
Haruka Hirata, Daiki Miyahara, Kazuo Sakiyama et al.· Proceedings of the 1st Works...· 0 citations
Deep learning has advanced profiled side-channel analysis, but for symmetric block ciphers the progress has concentrated almost entirely on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Lightweight block ciphers are now widely deployed in Internet-of-Things and edge devices and have become the subject of formal standardizati...
Boohyun An, Ahmed S. Al Ali, Cédric Tavernier et al.· IEEE Access· 0 citations
An attack that can recover the complete subscriber key from a single power trace with 40% success probability on average is presented, which combines profiled deep learning-based power analysis with Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solving.
Elena Dubrova, Sönke Jendral, Linus Backlund· Proceedings of the 1st Works...· 0 citations
It is shown that one power trace of the optimized pqm4 implementation on an Arm Cortex-M4 suffices, and that the two operations leak complementary information, and that the two operations leak complementary information.
Vahid Jahandideh· Proceedings of the 1st Works...· 0 citations
Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, designed to defend against quantum threats, present new implementation challenges, particularly their susceptibility to side-channel attacks (SCAs). Unlike traditional attacks that exploit mathematical weaknesses, SCAs target physical properties—such as timing, power, and el...
Cate Richards, Chris Woods· IISE Annual Conference &...· 0 citations
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