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Compression: Impossible — Securing Hardware-Level Memory Compression

2027 · Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 1 · 0 citations · 9 references

Abstract

Transparent hardware-level memory compression has become increasingly attractive for commercial deployment, particularly in hyperscalers and cloud infrastructures. While it is well known that compression can introduce data-dependent leaks, as the compressibility of data inherently depends on its content, a common intuition is that such leaks can be mitigated using constant-time compression algorithms. Unfortunately, as we show in this paper, despite constant-time compression algorithms, all existing designs suffer from information leakage vulnerabilities due to inherently-insecure architectural design decisions. We develop several novel leakage primitives that exploit the fundamental design aspects shared across existing proposals. Relying on these leakage primitives, we show secret-dependent behaviors in widely-used cryptographic libraries and construct an end-to-end attack that leaks passwords from a popular web server. To secure memory compression against these serious vulnerabilities, we introduce a new compression non-interference property and prove that a compression system that adheres to this property does not introduce any leakage primitives. We then demonstrate that practical and secure memory compression is achievable by designing a new secure memory compression system called ZipLock. Our evaluation shows that compared to the insecure state-of-the-art baseline, ZipLock incurs only 3.5% performance overhead while providing a similar compression rate of 1.65x.

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