This work produces an end-to-end security theorem formalized in the Lean proof assistant, eliminating hidden hypotheses by building only on Lean's standard axioms, and sets a reproducible standard for security arguments in quantum cryptography.
Abstract
Quantum key distribution provides secure communication by relying on physics principles and mathematical reasoning. Security proofs across the field can contain gaps, often between individually valid theorems integrated under mismatched assumptions. We produce an end-to-end security theorem formalized in the Lean proof assistant, eliminating hidden hypotheses by building only on Lean's standard axioms. Our proof covers composable security of the entanglement-based qubit BB84 protocol against coherent attacks by the postselection technique, accounting for finite block size, and is written in a language that enforces local operations and classical communication to help ensure a faithful representation of the protocol. The proof itself was enabled by LLM-based autoformalization, and with the proof complete, we used the same pipeline as a discovery machine, reducing the finite-size penalty on the key rate. Our work sets a reproducible standard for security arguments in quantum cryptography and shows how formal proof engines can accelerate discovery across quantum information science.
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