Reconstructing DPR Oversight Norms: Constitutional Implications of Weakening Checks and Balances in Indonesia

Abstract

The constitutional oversight function of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) faces severe challenges under a supermajority parliamentary composition, which tends to weaken legislative control. This study analyzes the institutional barriers within Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014 (UU MD3) during the 2024–2029 DPR composition, where the pro-government coalition controls 81.0% of legislative seats. This research offers novelty by identifying a specific legal gap in the quorum provision of Article 79 paragraph (3) of Law No. 17 of 2014. It proposes a "qualified minority right" mechanism with a 15% threshold and mandatory proportional representation of minority factions. Utilizing a normative juridical research method with comparative, statute, and conceptual approaches, this paper examines how expansive ruling alliances weaponize formal legislative frameworks to neutralize accountability tools. The findings reveal that while the statutory threshold for initiating an inquiry is legally accessible to the 19.0% opposition faction, the true normative defect lies in the mandatory plenary-majority approval requirement. This allows the supermajority coalition to enforce an absolute institutional veto. To resolve this, this study proposes an automatic statutory minority prerogative that eliminates the majoritarian plenary veto.