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Behavioral Participating Insurance: Optimal Investment under Probability Distortion and Aspiration Constraints

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 37 references
Economics

Abstract

We study optimal investment for insurers managing participating (profit-sharing) contracts under probability distortion and probability benchmark (aspiration) constraints. The problem combines three theoretical complexities: (i) nonconcave effective utilities induced by embedded guarantees and surplus-sharing rules, (ii) probability weighting capturing behavioral aspects of long-horizon decisions, and (iii) aspiration-type constraints formalizing solvency requirements. Using quantile formulations and concavification techniques, we derive explicit closed-form solutions for optimal terminal wealth and trading strategies in both complete and incomplete Black-Scholes markets. Our utility class accommodates the piecewise hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (PHARA) family and covers nonconcavities arising naturally in insurance contexts. The framework reveals how probability distortion weakens lock-in behavior and induces time inconsistency: under inverse S-shaped distortions, insurers overestimate upside probabilities and increase risky investment relative to undistorted benchmarks. Asymptotic analysis and numerical illustrations demonstrate regime switches in optimal policies driven by regulatory thresholds and capital constraints. Our results extend the hope-fear-aspirations framework of He and Zhou (2016) and provide practical insights for managing insurance balance sheets under behavioral preferences and solvency constraints.

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