Skip to content
Open access

Ghosts in the Memory: Detecting Unintended Sensitive Data in Android Apps

Oct 2026 · Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering · Vol 3, pp. 2452 - 2474 · 0 citations · 42 references

Abstract

Android apps often retain sensitive information such as co-users’ data, authentication tokens, and encryption keys in memory, leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access. Existing dynamic analysis tools struggle to detect such memory-resident leaks because of three fundamental challenges: (i) runtime application self-protection (RASP) and other anti-analysis mechanisms actively detect and block conventional instrumentation;(ii) the semantic gap between high-level data types and their raw memory representations obscures sensitive content; and (iii) the transient nature of memory-resident data causes snapshot-based methods to misscritical exposures. We present Android-MRI, an OS-level analysis tool that embeds tracing directly into the Android kernel to detect unintended sensitive data leakage through memory while remaining invisible to application-layer defenses. Android-MRI provides instruction-granular monitoring to track the propagation of sensitive data in memory, surfacing the full context of unintended persistence. In an evaluation of 50 popular apps (≥1M installs), Android-MRI bypassed 97.6% of RASP protections (vs. 52.4% for Frida) and revealed 17 previously unknown memory disclosures. These included leaks of profile PINs, subscription-only content, and cryptographic keys. 12 vendors confirmed the issues; 4 have patched them, and 3 (Netflix, Smule, and Delivery Express) acknowledged them via bug bounty programs.

Read PDF

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.