SkillGate, a deployable security gateway that screens AI skill packages before coding agent installation is presented, and four research questions covering detection effectiveness, screening cost, runtime overhead, and false positive behavior on the SkillsBench benchmark against two existing tools are answered.
Abstract
Software engineering teams now deploy AI coding agents (Cursor, Claude Code, GitHub Copilot) as first-class productivity tools, installing domain-specific skill files to tailor agent behavior to project APIs, framework conventions, and organizational workflows. These complex Markdown files are easily downloaded from public registries with a single npx skills add command and no real security screening, representing a novel supply-chain attack surface: a malicious skill file can silently reprogram agent behavior, exfiltrating credentials, injecting backdoors into generated code, or redirecting agent actions to attacker-controlled endpoints. The threat is not hypothetical: recent reports document hundreds of malicious skill packages in public registries, including organized campaigns that distributed credential-stealing infostealers via fake productivity skills. No systematic toolchain defense exists for this attack surface. We present SkillGate, a deployable security gateway that screens AI skill packages before coding agent installation. SkillGate uses a hybrid regex-prefilter + LLM-judge pipeline: safe-signal files bypass the LLM entirely (skip savings); flagged files have only their matched snippet windows sent to the judge, not the full content (snippet savings). We answer four research questions covering detection effectiveness, screening cost, runtime overhead, and false positive behavior on the SkillsBench benchmark against two existing tools. On SkillsBench (n=1,650, 9.1% malicious), SkillGate achieves F1=0.817, FPR=1.13% while reducing LLM input tokens by 77% vs. full-file screening, and outperforming existing tools by 5-6x on threshold-independent AUPRC (0.830 vs. 0.144/0.162).
A systematic evaluation of malicious issue requests against state-of-the-art coding agents powered by two major model families reveals critical vulnerabilities in the as-deployed modern coding agents, highlighting the urgent need for stronger agent- and model-level safety mechanisms to protect AI coding agents.
Ankur Singh, Jinqiu Yang, T. Chen· arXiv.org· 2 citations
The results show that reliable malicious-Skill detection requires both broader cross-source benchmark coverage and evaluation that jointly measures attack detection and benign over-flagging.
CIPR (Coding In Poisoned Repos), the first benchmark that systematically varies PLCs in poisoned real-world repositories, is introduced and highlights that coding agent vulnerability is not a static property, but a dynamic outcome shaped by everyday user configurations.
Fu-Kang Zhu, Bin-Bin Zhao, Rui-Xiao Lin et al.· 0 citations
Results show that skill ecosystems expose a practical resource-amplification attack surface that is orthogonal to existing security-oriented skill poisoning, and shows that iterative optimization provides additional benefit beyond initial attack-type selection.
An adversarial skill-synthesis method using six LLMs across four families to transform 471 real-world shell commands into benign-appearing skills, released as a benchmark of 2,826 skills mapped to 11 MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Rui Yang, Michael Fu, Kla Tantithamthavorn et al.· 0 citations
This work measures only rules whose condition is decidable from bytes and whose consequence is a security exposure, a configuration that cannot work as written, or a departure from the Agent Skills specification, and validates every finding before it counts.
Benjamin Kapner, Carmel Soceanu, A. Petrunin et al.· 0 citations
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