Competence in R&D Among Asymmetric Universities: An Approach from GameTheory

Abstract

This article develops a theoretical model to analyze the interaction between competitions andcooperation in public competitions for the allocation of research and development (R&D) resources, withan emphasis on universities with asymmetric capabilities. Using a Tullock-type framework, a strategicgame is modeled in which universities decide how much effort to invest to increase their probability ofsuccess and how much knowledge to transfer to their competitor. The institutional proponent’s evaluationof performance includes not only individual outcomes but also attributes such as cooperation and priorexperience. The model shows that cooperation can emerge endogenously if it is institutionally incentivized,and that knowledge transfer acts as a strategic externality that modifies the marginal costs of effort.Through numerical simulations, the effects of explicit incentives, structural asymmetries, and mandatorycooperation policies on equilibrium are analyzed. The results reveal strategies for designing public policiesthat seek to balance efficiency, equity, and collaboration in science and technology systems.