NeuroBreak is presented, a visual analytics system that helps experts progressively unpack jailbreak mechanisms from layer-level semantics down to neuron-level behaviors and provides actionable insights for strengthening LLM defenses.
Abstract
Jailbreak attacks bypass the safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) to elicit harmful outputs, yet the vast parameter space makes diagnosing the underlying failure mechanisms extremely challenging. We present NeuroBreak, a visual analytics system that helps experts progressively unpack jailbreak mechanisms from layer-level semantics down to neuron-level behaviors. A layer-wise probing pipeline traces how harmful representations evolve across layers, while a dual-dimensional character--behavior categorization reveals each safety-related neuron's inherent tendency and contextual contribution. These analyses are made interpretable through tailored visualization designs: a task-driven probing projection that reveals safety decision boundaries, a dual-stream semantic evolution flow that traces cross-layer semantic shifts, and a character--behavior chord graph that unifies neuron roles, attribution scores, and collaborative relations in a single view with in-situ causal verification. Quantitative evaluations and case studies show that NeuroBreak uncovers safety failure causes and provides actionable insights for strengthening LLM defenses.
A mechanistic analysis of the jailbreaking behavior in a large-scale, safety-aligned LLM, focusing on LLaMA-2-7B-chat-hf identifies computational circuits responsible for generating affirmative responses to jailbreak prompts and uncovers key attention heads and MLP pathways that mediate adversarial prompt exploitation.
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A training-free defense that first identifies safety-specific neurons through per-neuron hypothesis tests under false-discovery-rate control together with a utility-specificity filter, and reduces the average attack success rate to at most 2.0% while incurring a utility drop of only 0.3% on MT-Bench, the smallest among...
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Large audio-language models (LALMs) expand language models to process and interpret audio, but also expose them to heterogeneous audio jailbreaks. We ask whether successful jailbreaks reflect failures to recognize harmful intent or failures occurring after such recognition. Layer-wise probing reveals the latter: risk-r...
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