Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks

Abstract

Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are embedded in software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising “jailbreak" stakes beyond text-only settings. Prior evaluations emphasize refusal or harmful-text detection, leaving open whether agents compile and run malicious programs. We present JAWS-BENCH(Jailbreaks Across WorkSpaces), a benchmark spanning three escalating workspace regimes mirroring attacker capability: empty (JAWS-0), single-file (JAWS-1), and multi-file (JAWS-M). We pair it with a hierarchical, executable-aware Judge Framework that tests (i) compliance, (ii) attack success, (iii) syntactic correctness, and (iv) runtime executability to measure de-ployable harm. Across seven LLM backends from five families, prompt-only attacks in JAWS-0 achieve 61% compliance; 58% are harmful, 52% parse, and 27% run end-to-end. In JAWS-1, compliance reaches ~ 100% for stronger models with a mean ASR (Attack Success Rate) ≈ 71%; JAWS-M raises mean ASR to ≈ 75%, with 32% runnable attack code. Wrapping an LLM in an agent increases ASR by 1.6×, by overturning initial refusals during planning and tool use. Additional evaluations with SWE-Agent and OpenAI Codex exhibit similar trends, indicating that JAWS-BENCH can be reused across multiple agent frameworks. Category analyses identify which attack classes are most vulnerable and deployable, motivating execution-aware defenses and refusal-preserving agent designs.