This paper claims that an in-depth investigation of the adversarial robustness of NeSy models is necessary and provides the first systematic evaluation of backdoor attacks against NeSy, and shows that while NeSy models are indeed more robust than their neural counterpart on average, their robustness vastly depend on the strictness of the reasoning process being enforced and its compatibility with the chosen adversarial target.
Abstract
Neuro-Symbolic (NeSy) AI has recently emerged as a novel paradigm to enable trustworthy AI, aiming at integrating sub-symbolic neural perception with grounded symbolic reasoning. The neuro-symbolic integration process that characterizes these models has been proven beneficial to achieve more transparent, explainable and efficient AI systems. Meanwhile, their properties under adversarial settings have been overlooked being frequently deemed robust-by-design. However, the neural-symbolic integration process they leverage constitutes an additional layer of complexity that may provide an attack entry-point. Therefore, in this paper, we claim that an in-depth investigation of the adversarial robustness of NeSy models is necessary and provide the first systematic evaluation of backdoor attacks against NeSy. To this end, we compare the most popular NeSy framework, namely DeepProbLog, against baseline neural networks across a total of eight backdoor settings and four reasoning tasks. Our experimental results show that while NeSy models are indeed more robust than their neural counterpart on average, their robustness vastly depend on the strictness of the reasoning process being enforced and its compatibility with the chosen adversarial target. The source code to reproduce our experiments is made available at https://github.com/marcoantoniocorallo/NeSy-Backdoor.
A systematic analysis of 207 studies selected from 4447 records following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, covering work published between 2020 and 2026 across cybersecurity and computer vision finds systems that are robust against adaptive adversaries, interpretable under operational constraints, and auditable in environme...
It is shown that the same feature-learning dynamics that make neural networks powerful can also make them more vulnerable to backdoors, and that security audits based on linear heuristics can systematically underestimate backdoor vulnerability in the widely adopted feature-learning regimes.
Issam Seddik, Mohamed El Amine Seddik· 0 citations
This work proposes O-Attack, a highly transferable black-box attack framework that outperforms six state-of-the-art methods in black-box transferability, with consistent effectiveness across prompts and improved efficiency and imperceptibility.
Sen Nie, Jie Zhang, Zhong Ling Wang et al.· 0 citations
This paper proposes a novel LVLM attack method, called BadPhase with further backdoor designs, to implant adversarial phase as triggers into any image inputs via data poisoning so as to control the LVLMs’ predictions and finds that LVLMs are sensitive to the phase-aware image structure.
Dai-Zong Liu, Junhao Dong, Xiang Fang et al.· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
A structural causal model (SCM) is introduced that generates a realistically grounded, labelled dataset of user-sessions, with coordinated multi-account campaigns, platform feedback, and three tiers of label observability.
Across CIFAR10, COIL100, and ETH80 under FGSM and Genetic Attack, ViT + Classical HDC degrades more gracefully than Pure HDC and ViT + HDC baselines, and achieves higher normalized AURC, lower attack-time decision margins, and larger gains from partial adversarial retraining.
Hamza Errahmouni Barkam, Salaar Saraj, Zhen Ye et al.· International Symposium on L...· 0 citations
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