This work proposes Defense-as-Skill, a defense paradigm that implements the runtime guard itself as an installable, inspectable, and editable skill, and demonstrates transfer across victim models, held-out risk families, and external benchmarks, as well as retained protection against adaptive attackers.
Abstract
Skill-augmented agents load reusable skills as persistent runtime context, improving task performance but also giving malicious skills a durable channel for steering future actions. Such skills may leak secrets, corrupt code, bypass approvals, or stage data for exfiltration only after a concrete user task and workspace state make the unsafe action appear useful. This makes pre-install vetting insufficient and calls for runtime, task-conditioned protection. We propose Defense-as-Skill, a defense paradigm that implements the runtime guard itself as an installable, inspectable, and editable skill. Our guard, SkillSonar, runs alongside untrusted task skills and checks sensitive actions against the user's task boundary, routing each action to an allow, replan, or confirmation decision without modifying the underlying agent runtime. To study this setting, we construct SCOPE-R, a task-conditioned dataset covering 6 risk families and 21 sub-categories, with 206 attack-confirmed malicious instances and 43 benign tasks. We then improve SkillSonar on the SCOPE-R training subset using runtime guard-skill evolution, a Monte-Carlo Tree Search procedure that evolves the on-disk guard skill from feedback on the rollouts. Across Claude Code and OpenClaw, the evolved guard substantially reduces attack success while maintaining a favorable safety-utility trade-off. On repeated GLM-5 runs, SkillSonar reduces ID ASR from 0.482 to 0.104 and OOD ASR from 0.606 to 0.115. Further analyses demonstrate transfer across victim models, held-out risk families, and external benchmarks, as well as retained protection against adaptive attackers. Ablations further show that explicit safety responsibility assignment and the skill-native representation are both important to the observed gains.
Results show that two-stage defense feedback can serve as a useful learning signal for adaptive red teaming and that evaluating either defense stage in isolation can miss the resulting attack capability.
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Results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.
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This work presents SkillSentry, a dynamic safety-testing framework based on adaptive honey worlds, which infers the intended capability boundary of a skill, constructs an LLM-simulated environment with controlled decoy resources, and adaptively generates tasks to explore its behavioral states.
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SkillShift is presented, a constrained black-box framework for covert policy steering without explicit target command injection or task hijacking that combines semantically plausible policy edits with hierarchical validation, failure-guided optimization, and strategy compression to preserve effectiveness, output validi...
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The results suggest that high-risk Skills should co-package typed invocation policy with procedural knowledge, so that physical actions depend on machine-checkable evidence rather than peer-agent claims.
Tool-using AI agents can invoke internal APIs, retrieve documents, update records, and coordinate enterprise workflows. These capabilities create a runtime security problem: an agent may select an unauthorized tool, hallucinate an endpoint, follow malicious instructions embedded in retrieved context, rely on poisoned m...
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