This work proposes VerTox, the first framework to formulate corpus poisoning as a verifiable reward-guided reinforcement learning (RLVR) problem, and produces adversarial documents that frequently rank higher than target documents across major neural ranking architectures, as well as a proprietary commercial embedding model.
Abstract
Neural ranking models have become core components of modern information retrieval systems and important building blocks of AI systems such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines. However, their robustness remains insufficiently understood in the presence of large language models (LLMs), which can generate fluent and deceptive content at scale. This work investigates the vulnerability of neural ranking models to corpus poisoning attacks, in which an adversary injects a small number of maliciously crafted documents into the corpus to distort ranking behavior. We propose VerTox, the first framework to formulate corpus poisoning as a verifiable reward-guided reinforcement learning (RLVR) problem. By explicitly coupling ranking distortion with factual corruption through specialized reward shaping, we fine-tune compact LLMs into adversarial generators. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves near-perfect attack success rates, producing adversarial documents that frequently rank higher than target documents across major neural ranking architectures, as well as a proprietary commercial embedding model. The generated adversarial documents are fluent and exhibit low perplexity, making them difficult to detect. Furthermore, by explicitly encouraging factual corruption, our adversarial documents significantly degrade the performance of a downstream RAG application.
Adversarial attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) aim to induce harmful content. However, existing methods suffer from high computational costs or strict model-pairing dependencies, limiting their scalability and transferability. We propose Reward Stealing Attack (ReSA), an adversarial attack framework that targets t...
Jia-Ming Qian, Peng-Yang Zhou, Jia-He Xu et al.· 0 citations
It is proved that, under an honest-majority assumption and a representation-level separation condition, RAGSentinel exactly recovers a poison-free majority-sized context.
Yueyang Quan, Anjun Gao, Yu Xia et al.· 0 citations
Large Vision--Language Models (VLMs) unlearning tends to eliminate the influence of ``to-be-forgotten'' content in the training corpora, algorithmically by suppressing the likelihood of faithfully generating responses on forget-target inputs. The injection of adversarial inputs can manipulate the unlearned VLM's genera...
Yi-Min Liu, Peng Jiang, Ya-Jie Wang· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
As textual adversarial attacks pose risks to natural language processing models, adversarial training is often utilized to improve robustness of these systems. In a strict black-box scenario, most query-based textual adversarial attack methods rely on fixed or limited perturbation policies and search in the perturbatio...
Hao-Tian Wu, Jia-Chen Xie, Jiankun Hu et al.· IEEE Transactions on Informa...· 0 citations
This paper proposes a novel LVLM attack method, called BadPhase with further backdoor designs, to implant adversarial phase as triggers into any image inputs via data poisoning so as to control the LVLMs’ predictions and finds that LVLMs are sensitive to the phase-aware image structure.
Dai-Zong Liu, Junhao Dong, Xiang Fang et al.· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
ToxicRAG is presented, a one-document-per-target attack that expresses misinformation as a coherent knowledge-update narrative that matches or exceeds the strongest evaluated baseline in every combination of dataset--model combinations.
Hao-Zhe Lu, Jia-Qiang Li, Xin-Yuan Zhu et al.· 0 citations
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