Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism in the Concept-Script

Abstract

The terms “inferentialism” and “logical expressivism” are linked together in Robert B. Brandom’s and other inferentialists’ philosophy. An inferentialist philosopher of language argues that the vocabulary of language is governed by inferential rules and a word receives its meaning from its inferential role. Brandom argues that in his Begriffsschrift (1879), Gottlob Frege appears as an inferentialist. In this paper, I will first discuss Frege’s idea of the concept-script, and seek to show a connection between Frege’s inferentialism and his later representationalism. That connection is illuminated by the way in which Frege develops Leibniz’s idea of a universal language. Secondly, I will consider Frege’s logical expressivism by showing similarities between Frege’s method of analysis and the method of problem-solving in ancient geometry. My conclusion is that the model of geometry helps us see how Frege tries to make reason transparent.