In this paper, we translate and interpret the passage from Nicomachean Ethics 7.1146a21-32, in which Aristotle presents a sophistical paradox when discussing the difficulties surrounding the theme of akrasia. We base our analysis on the description of paradoxes in On Sophistical Refutations and on the explanation of the functioning of the practical syllogism in Movement Animals. Finally, we present the argument put forward in the paradox, which equates an akratic fool with a sage, and we maintain that this sophistical reasoning is superficial, though it functions as an element that stimulates philosophical investigation
The attempt by neo-Aristotelian naturalists such as Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson to ground the objective validity of ethical principles in human nature has met with significant criticism. In particular, critics often reject the concept of life-form central to this view as incompatible with modern scientific biolo...
This article studies the division of falsehood in Divisiones Aristoteleae [31], which is preserved in three redactions: Recensio Marciana, Recensio Florentina, and Recensio Leidensis. I first examine the Recensio Marciana and argue that [31] aims to disassociate the falsehood of a πρᾶγμα from the falsehood of a λόγος b...
This volume presents a dialectic-idealist overview of natural language and natural (non-artificial) thinking. Pauli Pylkkö’s view is thoroughly non-classical and takes ambiguity and contradictoriness as vital and inalienable properties of all speaking and thinking. The main function of a sentence is to change the meani...
In Boethius’s Consolatio Philosophiae (CP), Lady Philosophy claims that happy people become gods. I argue that close attention to Lady Philosophy’s use of Platonic predication resolves four interpretive challenges posed by this claim: (i) the apparent discrepancy in CP iii 10.24, (ii) the use of deus rather than divinu...
We examine the rhetorical crafting of the example in Phaedrus’ Fabulae Aesopiae, focusing on the Prologus and Phaedr. 1.1–1.4 (Mueller, 1876). Drawing on Aristotle’s παράδειγμα and the Latin exemplum, we argue that the Phaedrian fable is a minimal, judgment-oriented narrative whose closure (pro-/epimythium or final sen...
Letícia Quintella Viana· Classica, Revista Brasileira...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.
