Aug 2026· International journal of computer information systems and industrial management applications· 0 citations
TL;DR
Memory Governance is introduced, a security-oriented framework that treats agent memory as a governed asset subject to continuous evaluation rather than passive storage that combines provenance tracking, weighted trust score with explicitly constrained weights, exponential confidence decay, and three-state quarantine containment to reduce the long-term influence of adversarial information.
Abstract
Long-horizon AI agents increasingly depend on persistent memory for planning and decision-making, creating an attack surface that existing defenses leave largely unaddressed. Prompt filtering and output validation protect individual interactions but offer no protection once adversarial information enters long-term storage. This paper introduces Memory Governance, a security-oriented framework that treats agent memory as a governed asset subject to continuous evaluation rather than passive storage. The framework combines provenance tracking, a weighted trust score with explicitly constrained weights, exponential confidence decay, and three-state quarantine containment to reduce the long-term influence of adversarial information. A Trust-Decay Memory Evaluation algorithm classifies each memory object as Trusted, Review Required, or Quarantined based on source reliability, validation history, and time-elapsed confidence. A discrete-time contamination propagation model, adapted from epidemiological dynamics, derives the condition μ > β under which governance controls drive contamination density to zero at steady state. Together, these mechanisms establish memory governance as an architectural security control rather than an interaction-level filter.
Agentic AI systems with persistent memory introduce a distinct attack surface known as memory poisoning, in which adversarially crafted content is stored in long-term memory and subsequently influences future agent behavior. Such attacks can suppress security alerts, facilitate privilege escalation, alter trust relatio...
SafeCommit, a risk controlled layer between agent reasoning and external execution, is introduced, a calibrated set of plausible latent worlds from memory, observations, tool outputs, provenance, and policy constraints that permits a side effectful action only when a conformal action certificate shows that the action i...
The results suggest that model-level alignment is not compositional: individually capable and apparently safe agents can form systems with qualitatively different failure modes as AI becomes persistent and interconnected.
Deepak Akkil, Tamer Abuelsaad, Karthik Vikram et al.· 0 citations
During a 2026 cyber-capability evaluation, short-lived AI agents turned a shared package repository into persistent memory, passing exploit findings to later agents and rebuilding the channel after it was removed, raising a question for defensive deception: can a honeytoken be harmless to trusted agents without becomin...
Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution environments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks. Existing work separately measures cyber capability and catalogs attacks against agent components, but provides less guidance on containing a capable agent within the environment...
A. B. Siddik· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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