Jul 2026· International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology· 0 citations· 17 references
TL;DR
It is argued that organizations should treat cryptographic migration as a present-tense operational requirement rather than a future contingency, regardless of unresolved disagreement among experts about when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will exist.
Abstract
The maturation of quantum computing hardware and algorithms has transformed what was once a theoretical
concern into an active planning priority for governments, enterprises, and standards bodies. This paper assesses the current
and projected threat that quantum computation poses to classical public-key cryptographic standards, namely RSA, elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman key exchange, all of which derive their security from mathematical problems
that Shor's algorithm renders tractable on a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer. We synthesize recent
hardware progress, algorithmic refinements that have substantially reduced estimated qubit requirements, and the
finalization of NIST's post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards (FIPS 203, 204, and 205) to provide an evidence-based
assessment of where the field stands as of mid-2026. Particular attention is given to the widening gap between optimistic
resource estimates, including a contested March 2026 claim of a thousand-fold reduction in factoring resources, and the
practical reality that no existing quantum computer approaches the logical qubit counts required to threaten deployed
encryption. We further examine migration challenges, including performance overhead, cryptographic agility, constraints
on embedded and IoT systems, and the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model that makes migration urgency independent
of exact timeline predictions. Drawing on NIST transition guidance and recent G7 coordination targets, we argue that
organizations should treat cryptographic migration as a present-tense operational requirement rather than a future
contingency, regardless of unresolved disagreement among experts about when a cryptographically relevant quantum
computer will exist. The paper concludes with practical recommendations for risk-based migration prioritization and
identifies open research questions in cryptographic agility and quantum-resistant system design.
This analysis demonstrates that while hybrid PQC-QKD models reduce long-term key compromise probabilities to near 0%, they introduce a 15% to 40% increase in bandwidth overhead during initial cryptographic handshakes during initial cryptographic handshakes.
R. Delhibabu· Frontiers of Computer Scienc...· 0 citations
It is concluded that a successful migration to post-quantum cryptography requires a gradual and hybrid transition strategy, supported by cryptographic agility and comprehensive practical evaluations of both security and performance.
This work develops and executes a practical benchmarking framework that compares classical RSA and simulated post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, and provides a concrete, implementable model for evaluating post-quantum cryptography under realistic computational conditions.
Rakesh Singh T., Hemalatha Eedi· International Journal of Com...· 0 citations
A practical migration framework for enterprises is presented, reviews the quantum threat and Mosca's inequality for timing the transition, summarizes the new standards with their key and signature sizes, and proposes a five-phase roadmap built on crypto-agility.
Mini T. V.· International Journal of Inf...· 0 citations
The study analyzes classical cryptographic vulnerabilities and reviews major PQC families: lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate-based, and isogeny-based schemes, highlighting the ongoing NIST standardization efforts.
Noah Wright, Isabella Moore· International Journal of Mod...· 0 citations
The paper concludes that harvest-now-decrypt-later, Q-Day attacks, and new quantum attacks are today’s most critical threats, which can be addressed by deploying PQC solutions and, thus, increasing security.