The proposed CodeSIFT, a threat-model-agnostic detection method that leverages influence functions to identify batches of prompts that induce anomalous model behavior, suggests that influence-function-based detection is a promising direction for identifying malicious code-generation prompts without requiring prior knowledge of the underlying attack class.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for code generation, yet they remain vulnerable to prompts that elicit insecure implementations. Existing defenses typically rely on predefined threat models or known vulnerability patterns, limiting their effectiveness against novel attacks. We propose CodeSIFT, a threat-model-agnostic detection method that leverages influence functions to identify batches of prompts that induce anomalous model behavior. Rather than detecting specific vulnerabilities, CodeSIFT measures the parameter-space influence of generated code and uses a statistical test to determine whether a candidate prompt set deviates from a benign reference distribution. To evaluate our approach, we introduce two benchmark datasets covering a variety of vulnerabilities. We evaluate CodeSIFT on three open-weight code LLMs ranging from 3B to 7B parameters, achieving AUROC scores of up to 0.98 at moderate-to-high injection rates, while maintaining well-calibrated false positive rates and substantially outperforming static analysis baselines. These results suggest that influence-function-based detection is a promising direction for identifying malicious code-generation prompts without requiring prior knowledge of the underlying attack class.
LLM-based code generation is now embedded in mission-critical pipelines, but defenses against vulnerable output remain post-hoc -- static analyzers, fine-tuned classifiers, or an LLM judge that screen completed code, ignoring the generating model's own internal state. We test a narrower, directly measurable question: w...
Experiments on eight code generation benchmarks show that CGMIA outperforms eight existing membership inference methods in most cases, and effectively detects known leaked APPS samples in StarCoder-7B's training data.
Dong-Dong Zhao, Jian Chen, Guan-Cheng Lin et al.· 0 citations
This work evaluates Jev, a decision model that instead selects directly from a declared set of candidates and returns a probability for each, against six open-weight autoregressive models and a frontier proprietary model, and builds JevVibe, a diagnosis-guided repair agent that uses predicted CWE labels to repair code...
Arshak Rezvani, Sasha Behrouzi, Ahmad Sadeghi· 0 citations
Reliable learning-based vulnerability detection requires high-quality labels, yet datasets built from vulnerability-fixing commits may label functions as vulnerable simply because they were changed by a security patch. We present VulValidate, a framework that uses LLM agents to coordinate dynamic analysis tools and con...
The application of LLMs for detecting malicious PowerShell scripts and producing human-interpretable explanations for their classification decisions are investigated, showing that LLMs are capable of identifying and explaining malicious PowerShell scripts, although performance varies across different models.
Meng Wang, Emma Topolovec, B. Arana et al.· 0 citations
This paper introduces a programming language-agnostic, transferable, adversarial attack that exploits this CLM vulnerability and demonstrates that this attack, even when computed using smaller code embedding models, is highly effective and transferable to larger, closed-source embedding models.
Kaicheng Wang, Li-Yan Huang, Jesse Thomason et al.· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.