Information environments, epistemic selves, and life’s end

Abstract

This paper examines how information environments shape individuals in the construction of what we dub epistemic selfhood. Using euthanasia as an illustration, we argue that end-of-life decision-making potentially suffers from this process when epistemic selfhood is malformed leading to decisions that lack proper justification. Our argument draws on Ian Hacking’s constructivist account of selves via public conceptualizations of human kinds, and then moves to the case of euthanasia to show that normalization dynamics create the kind of person who is thereby hindered in the capacity to make rational end-of-life choices. This is brought into stark relief where legislative frameworks seek to expand the range of cases, e.g., in Canada, where eligibility criteria for mental illness alone is under consideration. Under these conditions vulnerable individuals, lacking epistemic security, may make poorly grounded, misguided, decisions. Thus, we should promote information environments that support prudent practical reasoning, including at life’s end.