This work combines document parsing, static analysis, and Tree of Thoughts reasoning to make smart contract repair more accurate and practical and overcomes the limitations of linear reasoning.
Abstract
Smart contracts power blockchain applications such as DeFi and NFTs. However, once deployed, they cannot be modified. Even minor bugs can result in significant financial losses. Current AI-based repair methods rely on linear reasoning, which leads to the accumulation of errors and unreliable patches. Our method combines document parsing, static analysis, and Tree of Thoughts reasoning. We first convert audit reports into structured data. Then we use Slither to locate the exact vulnerable code. Our three-step framework explores multiple repair paths simultaneously, evaluates options, and eliminates poor choices. Finally, we verify patches through compilation and manual checks. We test our method on 50 real vulnerabilities from Code4Rena. Our method achieves a 62% single success rate and an 84% top-3 success rate, outperforming ContractTinker by 12 and 6 percentage points, respectively. We also increase the proportion of fully effective patches to 44%, while reducing defective patches from 38% to 22% and invalid patches from 10% to 4%. This approach overcomes the limitations of linear reasoning and makes smart contract repair more accurate and practical.
An executed exploit is reported showing a specification-level authorization defect that produced no high or medium impact finding, its consequence for repair metrics, where it biases both transition counts upward and can confound comparison between methods producing differently sized .patches.
Staley Ian· International Journal of Inn...· 0 citations
Under the single-shot, raw-bytecode-only protocol, current LLMs are not reliable standalone forensic tools, and their robustness has not been systematically tested against contracts adversarially designed to mislead analysis.
It is argued that compile rate is a scientifically unreliable metric for single-function vulnerability repair, and this is supported with five controlled experiments over 203 vulnerable functions from Big-Vul, three open-source code LLMs (350M to 6.7B parameters), and three prompting strategies.
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The results show that access to repository history is insufficient: concealment becomes most effective when benign and malicious changes jointly occupy the auditor's active review context or when the stated purpose plausibly accounts for the attack-bearing diff.
Splitting, a black-box wrapper that copies a fuzzer's queue state after a bug trigger and continues from that state in multiple branches, directing more effort toward the discovered region, provides a practical way to measure and improve fuzzers.
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It is found that planting harmful but benign-sounding reasoning in the actor's context can steer it to perform adversarial actions while evading monitors, an attack the authors term"plan injection".
Keertana Chidambaram, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis· 0 citations
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