Skip to content
Preprint

Information Aggregation and Social Networks: Responsiveness and Overturning

Jul 2026 · 0 citations · 16 references
Economics

TL;DR

It is shown that a network is uniquely optimal for some informational environment if and only if the focal agent observes every predecessor, and that which network performs best depends critically on the informational environment.

Abstract

This paper studies how network structure affects information aggregation in social learning. Agents sequentially choose actions based on private signals and observations of neighbors'actions. Comparing a focal agent's expected payoff across networks at a finite period, we show that a network is uniquely optimal for some informational environment if and only if the focal agent observes every predecessor. This characterization reveals that which network performs best depends critically on the informational environment. We then revisit two important implications of the characterization through transparent constructions: the star network can uniquely outperform every alternative under binary signals, while the complete network can do so with richer signals. These constructions highlight a trade-off between the responsiveness effect and the overturning effect: sparse networks facilitate information aggregation by preserving the responsiveness of actions to private signals, whereas dense networks facilitate information aggregation by revealing extreme information that overturns existing public beliefs.

View source

Similar papers

Open access Aug 2026

An optimal test for strategic interaction in network formation games

The random utility specification induces an exponential family structure under the null which is exploited to construct a similar test which exactly controls size (despite the the null being a composite one with many nuisance parameters).

Andrin Pelican, Bryan S. Graham · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

On the Sparsity of Optimal Information Structures

This paper uncovers general properties of optimal information structures by exploiting a linear-programming formulation of information design. A critical observation is that an optimum can be found as ``sparse,''i.e., many coordinates of the action-state joint distribution are zero. This implies that, once part of an a...

Masaki Miyashita · 0 citations

Working papers series

Dunia López-Pintado · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Strategic Opinion Manipulation in Multiplex Networks

A model of strategic opinion manipulation on multiplex networks, in which a platform merges L network layers with attention weights, and each agent, holding a private opinion, chooses (potentially different) reports on each layer, at a layer-specific misreporting cost, so as to pull the merged consensus toward their ow...

Raman Ebrahimi, Massimo Franceschetti · 0 citations
#artificial intelligence Preprint Sep 2026

Decentralized Optimal Equilibrium Learning Over Dynamic Networks

Networked decentralized optimal equilibrium learning dynamics in which agents generate randomized semantic content/discontent signals from local payoff comparisons and exchange time-stamped time-stacked tables rather than raw actions, payoff information or local estimates/parameters are proposed.

Seref Taha Kiremitci, Muhammed O. Sayin · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.