Results indicate that focused code context and domain constraints materially affect the detector's reported output.
Abstract
Ethereum non-fungible tokens (NFTs) implement ownership, transfer, authorization, and metadata operations through smart contracts, making contract vulnerabilities a direct risk to digital assets. Existing static analyzers provide efficient rule-based screening but can struggle with application-specific logic, whereas unconstrained large language model analysis may be distracted by irrelevant code or produce inconsistent outputs. We present a vulnerability-detection method that combines vulnerability-focused code slicing, an ERC-721-oriented knowledge base, and constrained DeepSeek analysis. Regular-expression patterns locate candidate statements for reentrancy, integer overflow or underflow, and timestamp dependence. A structure-aware context-window algorithm then extracts line-numbered code slices. DeepSeek analyzes each slice using explicit decision rules and a fixed output schema, and the resulting records support automated batch processing. On 450 NFT contract samples, the full configuration produced 437 positive labels, corresponding to a reported positive-label rate of 97.1%. Removing the external knowledge base reduced this rate to 87.11%, while analyzing complete contracts without the knowledge base reduced it to 73.78%. These results indicate that focused code context and domain constraints materially affect the detector's reported output.
A lightweight method for generating fuzz test cases under bytecode-level static guidance, and results indicate that static guidance, directed seed generation, and vulnerability-specific oracles each contribute to the final performance.
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Results show that LLM-based vulnerability injection is feasible, while exposing key limitations in scalability and diversity, and practical challenges including LLMs' non-determinism and the difficulty of preserving contract semantics are reported.
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A failure analysis of the representation layer underlying GNN-based smart contract vulnerability detectors finds one confirmed case of misclassification caused directly by a representation-layer failure; the prevalence of such failures in real-world contract populations remains an open empirical question.
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This paper proposes SVACS, a bytecode-based analysis framework to identify multiple co-existing vulnerabilities based on SWC registry to align with industry-standard security guidelines and assist security reviewers to ensure smart contract security.
Ankur Jain, Abhishar Anand, S. Tripathy· IEEE Access· 0 citations
Once deployed, smart contract bytecode is final and cannot be patched. Any vulnerability that ships with the contract becomes a permanent attack surface. Existing tools have clear gaps. Static analyzers such as Slither flag aggressively and tend to produce many false positives, while large language models (LLMs) reason...
S. Nguyen, Quang-Tien Tran, H. Vu et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
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