TopoIntent is presented, a system that compiles security intent into executable, compliance-checked network topologies, using a schema contract to constrain generation, retrieves reference architectures from a curated template library via dense-vector search, and applies staged fusion for intent-template alignment and security completion.
Abstract
Enterprise security topology design requires translating business intent, regulatory requirements, and risk assumptions into zones, boundary devices, inter-zone paths, and access-control policies. Existing NetOps automation tools mainly operate after this design is fixed, providing limited support for generating structured security topologies from underspecified natural-language requirements. We present TopoIntent, a system that compiles security intent into executable, compliance-checked network topologies. It uses a schema contract to constrain generation, retrieves reference architectures from a curated template library via dense-vector search, and applies staged fusion for intent-template alignment and security completion. The generated topology is checked against CIS Controls v8.1.2 safeguards visible at the topology layer, while unresolved cases are marked for manual review. Structural gaps are repaired through additive schema-preserving edits. The final topology is exported to Mininet scripts with kernel-level iptables ACLs, enabling executable reachability and allow/deny tests. Because no public benchmark exists for this requirement-to-topology task, we construct an evaluation set from reference security architecture diagrams. The retrieval set contains 22 templates and 44 synthetic intents across five scenarios, while the held-out set contains 7 templates and 14 intents from finance and government scenarios excluded from retrieval. On the held-out set, additive repair improves topology-visible CIS satisfaction from 0.78 to 1.00 in fewer than 1.5 rounds on average, and one feedback round raises the post-ACL policy pass rate from 0.78 to 0.88.
SymCert is presented, a framework implemented in Lean for building verified SMT-based analyses of Cedar policies that provide a verified symbolic compiler and authorizer for reducing policies to SMT formulas, a hierarchy enforcer for ensuring well-formedness of counterexamples, and a counterex-ample extractor for proving analysis completeness.
IntentP4 is presented, a formal-methods-aided pipeline that translates an operator's natural-language intent into a P4LTL specification and then into a replayable multi-packet test case, grounded throughout in compiler artifacts via a tool-queryable ProgramContext and gated by deterministic per-stage validators.
Ruonan Feng, Mingming Zhang, Yu Jiang et al.· Proceedings of the ACM SIGCO...· 0 citations
Deployed large language model (LLM) agents are now being used to interface with external tools, fetch information, run code, interact with user data and help with decision making at the workflow level. Therefore, their safety issues are not only related to the underlying model, but also to tool permissions, prompt design, retrieval sources, policy constraints, evidence validity, and varying operational contexts. While Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) has become a popular means of structuring safety arguments, many GSN-based safety cases are still reliant on manual inspection and can suffer from unsupported goals, incomplete evidence paths, undischarged assumptions, circular arguments, unaddressed defeaters, or insufficient coverage of hazards. This paper introduces MCSafe-GSN-HOL, a formal assurance framework for creating machine-checkable safety cases for deployed LLM agents that overcomes these disadvantages. The proposed framework translates the structured GSN arguments into Isabelle/HOL proof obligations, and formalizes the typed GSN elements, the hazard contracts of LLM-agents, the evidence-completeness conditions, the assumption-discharge rules, the defeater-resolution rules, and the incremental re-verification rules after deployment changes. The prototype was tested with 25 safety-case fragments from five representative scenarios of LLM-agents. Results demonstrate that MCSafe-GSN-HOL has 97.3% defect detection, 97.2% evidence coverage, 96.4% hazard-control coverage, and 62.7% reduction in review time compared to manual GSN review. The mean Isabelle/HOL checking time was 2.53 s/safety case, showing that theorem-prover supported assurance can still be practical for medium scale safety-case checking. The results overall support the conclusion that formally checked GSN safety cases can help with the traceability, auditability, consistency and maintainability of assurance processes for deployed LLM-agent systems.
Aakash Abhay Yadav, Shashank Shelat, B. Hinduja et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
This study investigates whether a frontier LLM can generate Dockerfiles and Docker Compose configurations for multi-service applications using repository contents without access to developer-authored deployment artifacts and analytically derives a minimal explicit deployment specification for information that cannot be reliably inferred from repository artifacts.
Oleg Grynets, Kyrylo Fursov, V. Lyashkevych et al.· 0 citations
The NIS-2 Directive increases the need for continuous, auditable compliance evidence and motivates a shift from document-based compliance toward machine-readable compliance artifacts. The Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) is a standard for this purpose, which the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) is adapting with Grundschutz++. However, companies are still managing extensive legacy IT security concepts (IT-SCs), and migrating them without verification could transfer outdated assets into the new format. While existing research primarily addresses the generation of new concepts, there is a lack of a verification framework that extracts legacy IT-SCs into an auditable intermediate representation, deterministically compares the extracted graph with an independently constructed reference state, and exports schemavalid OSCAL artifacts. This paper introduces the Automated Security Concept Structure Extraction and Reverse Topologychecking (ASSERT) Framework, which addresses this gap by using ontology-based extraction of legacy documents into formal document graphs, a five-class graph difference against a verified reference graph, and the export into schema-valid OSCAL outputs for system description and assessment evidence. Using the BSI's RecPlast dataset, we compare a local open-weight model and a commercial model across three configurations with different levels of reference-ontology exposure. The evaluation shows that ASSERT makes document-infrastructure inconsistencies measurable, but reveals a trade-off between discovering undocumented entities and enforcing a schema.
Lea R. Muth, Marian Margraf· International Conference on...· 0 citations
The results show that TraceGrant provides a unified governance layer that connects trusted user intent, runtime evidence, concrete tool execution, and verified task completion.
Bohao Liao, Jingchao Wang, Qipeng Song et al.· 0 citations