It is proved a bootstrap bound on a fitted model's functional loses coverage of the truth as n grows, the identification gap being O(1) while the bootstrap haircut is O(n^{-1/2}).
Abstract
Compositional reliability bounds for multi-agent systems multiply component reliabilities, a step licensed by a conditional-independence assumption that is routinely stated and rarely tested. We test it. Two instances of one model, in a two-agent handoff, co-fail on 90.0% of the missions on which either fails (log OR 6.66, 95% CI [6.38, 7.00]; phi 0.916), in a preregistered evaluation of 18,000 missions scored by deterministic code with no LLM judge. Substituting a different model reduces the association in six of six contrasts; substituting a different vendor, model already different, does not -- a registered hypothesis reported as a null. The error is signed and runs against the operator: positive dependence inflates joint failure above the independence product, so redundancy is over-credited exactly when components share a model. The assumption-free alternative is often vacuous, and fitting a dependence model is worse: we prove a bootstrap bound on a fitted model's functional loses coverage of the truth as n grows, the identification gap being O(1) while the bootstrap haircut is O(n^{-1/2}). More data makes such a certificate worse, with no visible symptom. We give a finite-sample certificate assuming no dependence structure: a linear program over the joint, over a Bonferroni-Clopper-Pearson box around measured co-execution moments. It is sound, sharp for the information supplied, and monotone in the moment family. Enriching ten moment functionals to fourteen narrows the identified interval by 85.7% and lifts the certified floor from 0.2455 to 0.4116. A companion anytime-valid certificate holds type-I error at 0.0471 under optional stopping. Common dependence statistics are marginal-bounded and can reverse an apparent ordering of conditions when the compared agents fail at different rates. Contracts, scoring code, analysis scripts, and the preregistration are released.
Security-adjusted reliability@k is proposed, which counts only rollouts that are both functionally correct and free of high-severity insecure patterns, which counts only rollouts that are both functionally correct and free of high-severity insecure patterns.
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