SafeNexus is introduced, a cross-modal safety alignment framework that adopts a dedicated neuron-level intervention strategy that outperforms prevailing state-of-the-art approaches on safety benchmarks spanning diverse modality combinations, while effectively preserving utility.
Abstract
Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising safety performance, extending them to Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exposes a significant gap between expanded multimodal capabilities and existing safety mechanisms. Current defenses remain predominantly confined to specific modal settings, thereby limiting their robustness against broader cross-modal threats. To bridge this gap, we introduce SafeNexus, a cross-modal safety alignment framework that adopts a dedicated neuron-level intervention strategy. First, we formulate a neuron localization paradigm that identifies functionally specialized neurons by characterizing intermediate-layer activation patterns and quantifying their functional salience through importance scoring. Building upon this paradigm, we exploit contrastive data to identify modality-bound safety neurons (BS-Neurons), and validate their role in regulating safety behavior within each modality via targeted suppression. Further cross-modal analysis defines modality-universal safety neurons (US-Neurons) as the shared subset of BS-Neurons identified across individual modalities, serving as the core for defending against harmful cross-modal attacks. We observe that suppressing these neurons substantially degrades safety performance across modalities, while leaving overall utility largely unaffected. Building on these insights, we propose two safety alignment strategies: activation-level safety amplifier and safety neuron calibrator. The proposed strategies enhance model safety through two distinct routes: the former amplifies the activation magnitudes of US-Neurons, while the latter selectively calibrates them via targeted fine-tuning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms prevailing state-of-the-art approaches on safety benchmarks spanning diverse modality combinations, while effectively preserving utility.
Neuron- and path-level interventions offer the finest-grained route to defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks, yet existing methods fall short of this promise, i.e., they often compromise model utility significantly. Specifically, one line of work suppresses toxic neurons to erase harmful sema...
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Uncovering the internal mechanisms underlying the safety capabilities of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for developing trustworthy artificial intelligence. Currently, mechanistic interpretability studies on multilingual safety are largely confined to local components, such as isolated neurons. However, this st...
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A fine-tuning-stage defense that simultaneously hardens LLMs against both attack classes by redistributing safety signals across a broader set of neurons, and provides a formal guarantee that NeuronGuard strictly reduces the attack success rate (ASR) upper bound.
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The results support a circuit-level interpretation of LLM safety and suggest that mechanistic abstractions can reveal stable and transferable patterns underlying aligned behavior.
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